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When Strategy is ‘Hybrid’ and not ‘Grey’: Reviewing Chinese Military and 
Constabulary Coercion at Sea 
 
Dr Alessio Patalano 
Reader in East Asian Warfare and Security 
Department of War Studies, King’s College London 
 




The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas 
(ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The ‘grey zone’ notion raises two issues. 
Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates 
confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military 
and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation 
between Beijing’s strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone 
construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to 
remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to 
control ‘rights and interests’ are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power 
within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese 
maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and 
is therefore better described as part of a ‘hybrid’ strategy.  
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On 30 July 2017, on a sandy ground in Zhurihe in the remote region of Inner Mongolia, dozens of 
soldiers jumped off combat helicopters to join their comrades in camouflage as their commander in 
chief, President XI Jinping, reviewed them for the first time. President Xi’s message for the parading 
troops was clear. ‘The Chinese people love peace. We will never seek aggression or expansion, but we 
have the confidence to defeat all invasions’ for ‘(n)o one should expect us to swallow bitter fruit that 
is harmful to our sovereignty, security, or development interests’. Xi expected the Chinese military to 
stand ready ‘to fight and win wars’ (Xinhua, 02 August 2017). Less than a week later, the Chinese 
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navy, or People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), was already answering to the President’s call with 
a regular live ammunition combat drill involving missile, surface, submarine, and air operations in 
the waters of, and in the skies above, the Bohai and Yellow seas (People’s Daily, 07 August 2017).  
 
President Xi’s comments and the PLAN’s training schedule that followed them are the most recent 
expression of a decade-long process of maritime modernisation and empowerment. Indeed, as it was 
recently calculated, with an average of nine new surface combatants commissioned every year since 
2010, there is little doubt that the Chinese navy stands out as a significantly fast-growing major 
military actor (Mugg and Cowan 2017; O’Rourke 2017; ONI 2015; DOD 2015, 10, 12; DOD 2017, 24-
27). In the Chinese maritime landscape, moreover, the PLAN is not the only actor that has been 
growing in capabilities and receiving wider responsibilities. As authoritative estimates have recently 
confirmed, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia 
(PAFMM) have also been undergoing significant organisational transformation and capabilities 
build-up (DOD 2015, 11, 14; DOD 2016, 69; DOD 2017, 56; O’Rourke 2017, 39-40; Morris 2017, 
Erickson and Kennedy, March 2016; Kennedy and Erickson 2017; Martinson 2017).  
 
As Beijing’s top leadership has put it, China is on a pathway to become a maritime power. Such an 
ambition matters. One major impact of these enhanced capabilities has concerned the use of coercion 
to prevent – in Xi’s own words – any ‘bitter fruit’ to harm Chinese sovereignty and security in the 
East and South China Seas (ESCS). In these two basins, analysts and practitioners agree that Chinese 
forces have been exerting a tailored form of coercion ‘below the traditional thresholds of high-end 
conflict’ to pursue the country’s maritime claims (Cronin et Al. 2014; DOD 2015, 14; Townshend and 
Medcalf 2016, 4, 5, 7, 8; DOD 2017, 12; Green et Al. 2017, 3-4). Indeed, Chinese coercive behaviour has 
more recently prompted scholars and officials to consider it as a manifestation of a new form of 
competition known as a ‘grey zone’ conflict (JMoD 2014, 2; Mazarr 2015, 1-4; Kapusta 2015, 23-24; 
Votel et Al. 2015, 102; Hoffmann 2015, 26). The strategy underwriting the ‘grey zone’ challenge – the 
current scholarly argument goes – would be one aimed at pursuing a change in the status quo of the 
disputes in the ESCS whilst avoiding high-end war. 
 
This paper questions the utility of the ‘grey zone’ construct as it raises two issues. Conceptually, it 
adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the 
understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary 
activities. This distinction, in turn, is significant for two reasons. First, this distinction contributes to 
elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing’s strategic objectives and maritime claims. 
Second, at sea, the nature of a coercive act is determined by its context, not by the agent (military, 
constabulary, and or militia). Military coercion is designed to achieve strategic objectives, increasing 
the Chinese ability to project hard power in a specific theatre. Constabulary coercion relates to the 
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narrower objective of controlling parts of the sea and the features in it. In the grey zone construct, the 
focus on ‘who’ conducts coercion as opposed to ‘what for’ prevents to link actions to intentions and 
repercussions. 
 
The paper finds that Chinese maritime claims to control ‘maritime rights and interests’ are a function 
of a broader strategic intention to project military power in the ESCS whilst preventing others to do 
the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic 
competition, and with it, the risk of war. For this reason, this paper argues that Chinese maritime 
coercion in the ESCS better matches the parameters of a hybrid strategy. This hybrid strategy 
mobilises military, constabulary and paramilitary means in a coordinated fashion, using political and 
legal rhetoric to justify them and to prevent or inhibit responses in the pursuit of geostrategic 
objectives. The paper is divided into three main sections, the first reviewing the adoption of the grey 
zone strategy concept against the wider maritime literature. The second section examines coercive 
activities and categorise them in relation to military and constabulary objectives. The third part of the 
paper, on the other hand, explores how Chinese authorities have mobilised political and legal 
rhetorical tools to present military and constabulary coercive activities as lawful and measured 
responses. This section connects the tactical layer of maritime coercion with its broader political 
context before drawing some conclusions on the wider implications of Chinese hybrid strategy at sea. 
 
The paper does not engage with the nature of Chinese maritime boundary disputes and sovereign 
claims as its analytical focus is on how Chinese claims are pursued. Geographic features in the South 
China Sea are referred to by their common English designation, in a fashion consistent with the 
arbitral tribunal in the Philippines case (PCA 2016, xix-xx). The paper refers to the island group in the 
East China Sea as Senkaku islands as they are under Japanese administrative control. These islands 
are claimed by China under the name Diaoyu Dao. The paper acknowledges the controversy over 
Chinese maritime claims as set out in relevant statements by Chinese authorities (PRC 1992; CMFA 
2012; CMFA 2014) as well as academic criticisms levelled against them (Malik 2013; Jacobs 2014; 
Hayton 2015; PCA 2016, 71-73, 84, 98, 111-118). In dealing with Chinese political and legal rhetoric, 
the paper draws upon the argument from literature on Chinese ‘three warfares’ regarding the 
Chinese systematic and coordinate use of communication, political, and legal tools in the conduct of 
its foreign and security policy (Cheng 2012; Halper 2013; Stokes and Hsiao 2013; Jackson 2015; Raska 
2015). In this respect, whilst the paper’s focus is on military and constabulary coercion, it 
acknowledges that coercive actions have included also the wider use of economic means especially in 
relation to maritime disputes with Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines (Cronin et Al. 2014, 12, 16; 




Shades of Grey or Layers of Hybridity? Reviewing the Frameworks  
Coercion at sea below the threshold of high-end conflict is not new, nor unusual. As James Cable’s 
work on naval diplomacy established in the early 1970s, at sea, ‘the space between peace and war’ – 
to borrow Nadia Schadlow’s expression – has never been an empty one (Cable 1999; Schadlow 2014). 
During the Cold War, the frequency of maritime activities taking place below such a threshold has 
propelled maritime strategists to study the impact of peacetime maritime activities on international 
politics (Martin 1967; Wylie 1967; Booth 1977; also Gray 2004). Cable, alongside with political scientist 
Edward Luttwak, were among the first to systematically label such activities. They called them 
‘gunboat diplomacy’ and ‘armed suasion’ – respectively (Cable 1999; Luttwak 1974).  
 
Yet, international analysts use Chinese coercion in the ESCS to articulate one a ‘new’ form of conflict. 
China’s brand of coercion is a ‘grey zone’ strategy (Green et Al. 2017, 21-33). What does this mean? In 
2010, the US Department of Defence brought ‘grey zone operations’ to international attention. These 
operations were regarded as assertive enough to fail to qualify as a ‘fully peace’ type of endeavours, 
but not belligerent enough to constitute wartime activities (DOD 2010, 73; Hoffman 2015, 29). Since 
then, ‘grey zone operations’ have come to refer to actions ‘below the traditional thresholds of high-
end conflict’ (Mazarr 2015, 5; Hoffman 2016, 26). These were ‘(…) characterised by intense political, 
economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state 
diplomacy, yet short of conventional war’ (Votel et Al. 2016, 102).  
 
The defining factor of the grey zone has concerned the degree of force it implied in action. Frank 
Hoffman has in fact defined conflicts in the grey zone as encompassing ‘deliberate multidimensional 
activities by a state actor just below the threshold of aggressive use of military force’ (Hoffman 2016, 
26). Michael Mazarr linked this method to ‘measured’ revisionist ambitions – which require a 
measured use of force. From his perspective, state actors like China and Russia were ‘(…) dissatisfied 
with the status quo and determined to change important aspects of the global distribution of power 
and influence in their favor’ (Mazarr 2015, 1). Mazarr’s Clausewitzian approach to the grey zone 
gauged an understanding of actions that involved ‘the holistic application of a mosaic of civilian and 
military tools, short of combat operations, to achieve gradual progress toward political objectives’ 
(Mazarr 2015, 64). From his perspective, revisionist powers were unwilling to risk major escalation; 
rather, they pursued gradual campaigns mobilising a variety of unconventional tools to achieve their 
objectives whilst trying to complicate or prevent responses (Mazarr 2015, 4). 
 
Outside the American context, the Japanese Ministry of Defence was the first government institution 
to formulate a description of Chinese coercion in relation to the ‘grey zone’. In December 2010, only a 
few months after the publication of the US Quadrennial Defence Review where the grey zone was 
first mentioned, the National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) introduced this type of conflict 
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in the Japanese context. In the document, the security situation in East Asia was described as one in 
which ‘there are a growing number of so-called “gray-zone” disputes—confrontations over territory, 
sovereignty and economic interests that are not to escalate into wars’ (NDPG 2010, 2). The 2013 
NDPG further articulated the concept, with the first definition presented in the subsequent defence 
white paper (NDPG 2013, 1, 2, 7). In practice, if not in name, the document sought to capture the 
Japanese perception of Chinese behaviour in the East China Sea. Grey zone activities were defined as 
encompassing non-peacetime contingencies involving: 
 
1) Conflicting positions between states, etc., over territory, sovereignty, economic interests 
including maritime interests and other forms of rights and interests; 
2) Not relying only on diplomatic negotiations among parties concerned in insisting on a certain 
position or demand; 
3) Showing physical presence frequently, or attempting or making changes to the status quo in 
an area related to the issue with unilateral use of physical means short of armed attack in 
order to appeal its position or to force acceptance of it (JMOD 2014, 2). 
 
The Japanese definition for (Chinese) maritime coercion was consistent with the grey zone literature. 
However, by focusing on state actions in matters of territorial sovereignty, it placed a stronger 
emphasis on the constrains on role of the armed forces in dealing with it. Recent scholarship has built 
on this point to detail how the Chinese brand of grey zone has focused on the use of non-military 
actors, especially in the South China Sea (Yung and McNulty 2015, 5-6). Yet, one comprehensive 
study of recent cases of Chinese coercion in the ESCS has returned to the basic point of the degree of 
force as the defining factor in the grey zone. The study has in fact expanded the definition of the 
Chinese ‘grey zone strategy’ to encompass ‘efforts beyond steady-state deterrence and assurance’ 
from ‘land, air, sea, cyber and space to economics, legal manoeuvres, and influence activities’ without 
‘resort to direct and sizeable use of force’ (Green et al. 2017, 21).  
 
This literature has done much to draw attention to the physical manifestations of the simmering 
tensions in the ESCS. In particular, in the Japanese context, the use of the grey zone framework is 
directly related to the constitutional limitations on the use of armed force, which in turn highlight the 
challenges to deal with robust, non-high end warfare actions. In adopting the grey zone framework, 
however, the literature has not engaged with four problematic assumptions. First, in the Chinese 
context, this framework assumes that Beijing’s coercive behaviour is somehow new – but authors 
never explain why. How does Mazarr’s well-articulated definition of grey zone differ from traditional 
forms of coercive naval diplomacy? Second, the expression ‘grey zone’ in itself is rather ambiguous in 
that it prevents to categorise maritime coercion – which can be related to different uses of the sea as a 
resource, as a means for transport, or as a space for dominion (Parry 2014, 1-3; Till 2009, 23-33). This, 
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in turn, raises the question of how and when actions are not part of a ‘grey zone’ strategy. Third, the 
grey zone notion assumes that an actor operating in it will not seek escalation – again, without 
explaining why. Hoffman specifically states that ‘(g)ray zone conflicts do not cross that threshold and 
use a different mix of methods, entirely short of bloodshed’ (Hoffman 2016, 29). The absence of 
bloodshed is somewhat an artificial distinction since one can know about it only in the aftermath of 
the conclusion of a given action. The fourth problematic assumption unfolds directly from the 
previous ones. If it is unclear what is new about Chinese grey zone strategy, and it is difficult to 
understand what is and is not part of it, it is similarly difficult to understand the intent behind it and 
how the aims to achieve it may change over time. What changes of status quo do constitute a 
‘measured revisionism’ and how do different actions contribute to articulate it? 
 
Is Chinese coercion so different to the point of justifying the use of a brand new label? From a 
maritime perspective, it is not. Or, at least, the grey zone framework is not as helpful as it has been 
suggested in capturing its degree of novelty. The ability of naval assets to conduct operations under 
the threshold of open war has in fact been a central premise to this type of writings. In defining 
‘gunboat diplomacy’, for example, James Cable clearly stated that this involved: 
 
The use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to 
secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute 
or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own 
state (emphasis added). (Cable 1999, 39) 
 
Part of the confusion unfolds from the counterintuitive observation that navies – and more broadly 
maritime forces – possess specific features that allow them to deliver coercion through a calibrated 
use, or threat of, limited force in a way that other armed forces cannot. Within this context, scholar 
Ken Booth suggested that the versatility, controllability, mobility, projection ability, access potential, 
symbolism, and endurance of the main naval delivery platform, the warship, were central to navies’ 
non-war roles (Booth 1977, 15-19; Speller 2014, 81). Maritime platforms were not, and are not, built 
with purely diplomatic functions in mind; yet, their balance in terms of combat and support 
characteristics empower them to conduct coercive actions. In the 1970s, Vice Admiral Stanfield 
Turner articulated this capacity into one of the US Navy’s four core missions. He called these 
activities – coercive or otherwise – as ‘naval presence missions’. In particular, he noted that a vessel 
could perform more missions than one at any given time and, as a result, the key issue to naval 
presence did not revolve around the categorisation of activities. Rather, context and purpose defined 
the nature of ‘presence’ operations (Turner 1974, 99-100). The defining factor of a presence operation 
was not the degree of force for this was related to the specific context. The key was in how a specific 
action connected to the broader context to produce a specific effect. 
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The above considerations lead to the correlation linking maritime capabilities to the array of coercive 
actions maritime assets can perform. Carriers may have more ways to implement coercive or other 
forms of diplomatic action than a frigate, a corvette, or even a maritime patrol aircraft, but this does 
not mean that smaller vessels – including coast guard cutters or even militia fishing boats – cannot 
perform coercion. Presence missions – including coercive ones – are not the exclusive prerogative of 
large capable naval forces alone. The versatility of maritime assets means that in some circumstances 
small vessels can be preferable. This is particularly true if the operation’s intended aim is to deliver a 
sense of restraint and/or to limit counter-actions (Le Mière 2011; Le Mière 2011b; Le Mière 2014, 
chapters 2, 4). On this point, Jerker Widen has recently underlined how the very expression ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’ came from the frequent use of relatively small vessels – gunboats – along riverine or 
coastal regions of the Asian and African continents to conduct actions that rewarded colonial 
ambitions without resulting in high end war (Widen 2011, 717). 
 
However, neither Booth nor his contemporaries writing on naval coercion have specifically dealt with 
constabulary coercion. This includes coercive activities designed to advance maritime claims as 
defined by regimes such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Whilst 
this literature appeared before UNCLOS, already in 1978, English School doyen Barry Buzan was 
noting that the oceans were becoming ‘an important source of disputes and conflict among states’. He 
considered that ‘current disorder’ arose ‘from a revolution in the rules and norms by which states 
regulate their activity on the global commons of the oceans’ (Buzan 1978, 1). Increasing competition 
over ocean resources meant that the convention that was debated at the time would not ‘so much 
resolve some disputes as contain them’. From his perspective, the document that came to be UNCLOS 
was not to ‘create order out of chaos, but rather define the terms of disorder’ (Buzan 1978, 2). 
 
Buzan was not alone in perceiving that the increasing significance of the sea as an exploitable 
resource would entail conflict, which for Buzan meant ‘situations in which at least one party pursues 
the dispute by non-peaceful means – usually the threat or use of force’ (Buzan 1978, 4). In 1980, 
shortly before the third conference on the law of the sea was concluded, Hedley Bull reviewed the 
risk of a scramble for resources and territorial claims. He noted that UNCLOS had the potential to 
nurture a form of ‘new mercantilism’, intended as ‘the use of force not to defend resources already 
possessed and legally owned but to seize resources belonging to others’ (Bull 1980, 5). As he pointed 
out, ‘nations will still seek to exert military power at sea to ensure that these rights are upheld. If they 
do not, nations will employ military force in any case to advance their demands in the anarchical 
situation that will prevail’. This, he further observed, will produce a ‘less publicised’ scramble for ‘the 
military instruments that will enable nations to make good their claims’ (Bull 1980, 5). The emergence 
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of UNCLOS, in both Buzan and Bull’s views, could plant the legal seeds for coercion and competition 
in the realm of constabulary activities to defend, assert, and consolidate claims. 
 
Upon this basis, whilst the Chinese use of military coercion at sea does not warrant the need of a new 
definitional framework, it would be unfair to claim that Beijing’s coercive activities in the realm of 
constabulary missions do not point to a degree of novelty. The emergence of UNCLOS as a legal 
regime for the oceans enables today Chinese authorities to coordinate and synchronise the use of 
military, constabulary, and irregular forces to pursue constabulary goals alongside strategic ones. In 
particular, to maximise the effects of coercion and minimise risks of responses, authorities in Beijing 
have come to regularly mobilise political and legal rhetoric to justify their actions and cast any 
response to their actions under an escalatory light. Winning without fighting is preferable to winning 
through waging war. 
 
Yet, the localised nature of military and constabulary coercion in the ESCS raises a question of their 
link to what Chinese doctrinal documents refer to as preparations for ‘local wars under high-tech 
(later informationalized) conditions’ (Fravel 2015, 3-7). These are considered as a specific type of 
peacetime strategic problem featuring ‘limited objectives in a part of an area where limited armed 
force is used’ (Fravel 2002, 91). One remarkable aspect of these local wars is that they stress the link 
between peacetime and wartime in a way that whoever ‘(…) combine peacetime preparations with 
the flexible management and fast reaction to sudden incidents will quickly control the situation’ 
(Fravel 2002, 93). Thus, the grey zone literature emphasis on exploring the space between peace and 
war too rigidly assumes the preference for coercive activities as a statement of commitment of not 
waging war, rather than one of a preferred line of action.  
 
Chinese military doctrine – with its nuanced distinction between peace and war, combined with the 
country’s actions at sea, comes much closer to meet the terms of NATO’s definition of a ‘hybrid 
strategy’. In NATO, a ‘hybrid strategy’ is defined as a ‘broad, complex, adaptive and often highly 
integrated combination of conventional and unconventional means, overt and covert activities, by military, 
paramilitary, irregular and civilian actors, which are targeted to achieve (geo)political and strategic 
objectives’ (original emphasis). Crucially, this definition does not stress the artificial boundary of a 
strategy that excludes military escalation, since ‘the use of overt military action as part of a hybrid 
strategy cannot be discounted’.1 This framework is similarly useful since its shifts the analytical focus 
away from the question of the use of force to explore the more significant link between intent and 
means. The preference in this paper for this definition is not meant to detract from the fact that 
 
1 NATO Alliance Command Transformation, ‘Hybrid Warfare’ presentation at 7th Annual NATO 
Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) Conference, Souda Bay, Greece, 08-09 
June 2016. 
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‘hybrid warfare’ remains a contested notion and NATO’s definition is not without critics (Schadlow 
2015; Kofman 2015; Van Puyvelde 2015; Galeotti 2016). 
 
 
Military and Constabulary Coercion: Actors and Activities 
What are, then, military and constabulary coercion about? According to a panegyric published in the 
Beijing’s Guangming Daily in 1974 and emphatically titled ‘The Paracels War’ (later republished in the 
People’s Daily and broadcasted on national radio), maritime coercion was a distinctive expression of 
China’s resolute defence of its ‘territory’. As the poem put it, the Chinese armed forces had to be 
praised for their determination not to surrender ‘an inch of its land nor a drop of its water’ against 
foreign encroachments.2 As celebratory as the poetry was, the essence of the behaviour was not lost 
on subsequent scholarship. Since then, academic research has in fact detailed Beijing’s history of 
coercion and use of limited force in dealing with maritime territorial disputes, notably in the bloody 
skirmishes with Vietnam in 1974 and 1988 (Fravel 2008). 
 
Yet, throughout the past decade, the role of the sea in Chinese national security has changed, and 
coercion in the ESCS has increased both in scope and manifestations. Military coercion has been pre-
eminently conducted by the country’s armed forces and has encompassed active measures – notably 
to interfere with foreign military activities – as well as a passive assertion, by means of major military 
enhancements of newly built island features. Constabulary coercion has been predominantly 
performed, on the other hand, by China’s law-enforcement agency, the CCG and the PAFMM. This 
distinction, whilst important, should not – however – be taken too rigidly, as pointed out above. 
Chinese military doctrine makes it clear that ‘ocean defence’ is a multi-service endeavour, aimed at 
the legal goal of territorial affirmation as much as at the strategic ambition to become a maritime 
power (Erickson 2016, 4-6). Furthermore, maritime assets can, by design and as a virtue of the sea as 
an operational environment, be employed to conduct both types of missions at any given time. This 
has meant, therefore, that it is difficult in some cases to draw clear operational distinctions, a fact 
compounded by the integrated nature of Chinese command structure (Li 2017; Kennedy and Erickson 
2017). 
 
Coercive ‘military’ activities in the ESCS have included missions such as intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR), patrol deployments, and training. Their coercive nature is defined by 
attempts to test foreign naval capabilities and probe opportunities to assert presence and contest 
foreign militaries operational access and manoeuvre; military coercion encompasses activities to 
shadow, harass, interfere with, and deter operations by foreign militaries in international waters. The 
 
2  ‘Peking Celebrates Its Paracels Victory with an Epic Poem’, 19 March 1974, Doc. No. 
1974HONGK03095, Message to State, The National Archives, United States. 
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main aim is to tactically shape the operational environment of the ESCS to favour China’s conduct of 
military operations in both theatres and limit and obstruct those of other state actors. Constabulary 
coercion, on the other hand, has focused more narrowly – as one senior Chinese military author from 
the Department of National Defence Mobilisation at the National Defence University described them 
– on low-intensity maritime rights protection operations.3 They are aimed at achieving the goal of 
declaring, supporting, or enforcing Chinese territorial claims. The key difference between the two 
categories therefore relates to whether the activity in question can be directly linked to the defence of 
a specific maritime territorial claim or not. 
 
Instances of coercive military encounters in the ESCS are well documented (Green et al. 2017, chapter 
3; International Crisis Group 2016; Cronin et al 2014, 11-18; Odom 2010). These have encompassed 
activities such as shadowing operations of foreign surface groups; controversial ‘unsafe’ air 
manoeuvres in international air space; the establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea, and the use of ‘shouldering’ and other intimidating tactics against 
military platforms from countries, such as the United States, Japan, and the Philippines (Cooper 2016; 
Martinson 2016b; Wanklyn 2015; Chen and Glaser 2015; Young and McNulty 2015; Patalano 2014; 
Thayer 2013; Odom 2010). These encounters have often taken place not far from waters or island 
features claimed by China, but they aimed at affecting foreign military patrol operations in a way 
akin to declaring strategic interests. Two recent examples provide clear cases in point. In 2013, a 
Chinese warship reportedly locked its weapons-guiding radar on a Japanese destroyer on a routine 
patrol some 110-130km north of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Kyodo 2013; International Crisis Group 
2016, 8, 20).4 In 2014, two Chinese SU-27 jets flew in dangerous proximity to both a Japanese maritime 
OP-3C surveillance aircraft and a YS-11EB electronic intelligence aircraft in the airspace where the 
Japanese and Chinese ADIZ overlap (Akita 2014; International Crisis Group 2016, 8, 20). These 
operations have been all ‘active’ manifestations of a strategy of coercion, as they signalled an 
intention to contest an operational theatre and probe military capabilities of competing actors. 
 
By contrast, in the South China Sea, military coercion has also included passive assertion measures 
such as the development of shore-based infrastructures for military use (Townshend and Medcalf 
2016, 11-14). These are ‘passive’ measures in that once they are in place they perform their function 
not as part of a specific response, or initiative – their existence is an act of coercion in itself. This has 
occurred within the context of the island-reclamation and upgrading efforts of seven features China 
occupies in the Spratly islands, and of an equal number of features in the Paracel Islands (AMTI 2017; 
AMTI 2016). In the Spratlys, China has created a staggering thirteen square km of land to 
 
3 Kennedy, Conor M. (2017) ‘Maritime Militia Operations and Trends – Gray Zone Tactics’, paper 
presented at the conference China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, China Maritime Studies Institute, 
Naval War College, RI, 2-3 May, 110. 
4 Author’s interviews with senior Japanese naval officials, Tokyo, April 2013. 
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accommodate port facilities, radar stations, airstrips, reinforced hangars, close-in weapons systems 
(CIWS), and point defence system (DOD 2017, 12; AMTI 2017b; Fennell 2016, 32). These facilities are 
considered to be operational and capable of supporting both constabulary and, crucially, sustained 
military operations (Fennell 2016, 32-33; Clapper 2016; AMTI 2017). The hangars in the Spratlys are 
capable of accommodating 24 fighter jets, and relevant air refuelling and logistical support assets 
(AMTI 2017). In the Paracels, three outposts field protected deep-water harbours. Five include 
helicopter pads, whilst Duncan Island houses a full helicopter base and Woody Island musters an 
airstrip, reinforced hangars, and surface-to-air HQ-9 missile batteries – in addition to a variety of 
civilian buildings (AMTI 2017). On 29 March 2017, a j-11 fighter was visible on the island’s runaway, 
confirming earlier reports of these assets’ deployment to the island (Johnson 2017; Townshend 2016). 
In December 2017, Chinese media too acknowledged the deployment of aircraft, broadcasting j-11B 
fighters entering a hangar on Woody Island (Global Times, 01 December 2017).  
 
In the realm of constabulary coercion, China’s law-enforcement and militia organisations have been 
the pre-eminent ‘blunt defenders of sovereignty’ (Morris 2017, 75). The CCG is the main law-
enforcement actor designated to protect and preserve national maritime rights (Morris 2017, 85; Hong 
2015; Martinson 2015). Institutionally, this task underwrote the reform to establish the CCG in 2013, 
when four organisations were merged together and put under the responsibility of the civilian State 
Ocean Administration (SOA). The CCG brought together the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), the 
Maritime Border Police (MBP), the Fishing Regulation Administration, and the General 
Administration of Customs (Hong 2015). A fifth organisation, the Maritime Safety Administration, 
remained instead under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport with the responsibility to 
conduct search and rescue activities. The reform had two goals: firstly, it sought to increase command 
and control mechanisms; and secondly, it was designed to reduce the risk of uncoordinated actions 
by separate commanders (Hong 2015). The result was the creation of the largest coast guard in the 
world. As of 2016, the CCG had in fact increased its aggregated tonnage by an estimated 73% 
compared to 2010 (Morris 2017, 78); crucially, it commanded a force of more than 450 patrol vessels, 
including two ‘super cutters’ with an astonishing 12,000t displacement, at least 24 vessels displacing 
more than 3,000t, and an estimated 79 ships more than 1,000t (Martinson 2015, 45). Similarly 
important, recent scholarship has unveiled that the reform of the academy training and education 
would suggest the intention to consolidate the CCG’s use in muscular enforcement activities 
(Martinson 2017, 18-20). 
 
The CCG is complemented by the PAFMM. The maritime militia are organised group of patriotic 
fishermen recruited from China’s coastal regions. Reportedly, these irregular forces draw upon a 
tradition established in the early days of the PRC, when irregular forces were responsible to carry out 
the ‘people’s war at sea’ (Erickson and Kennedy, 2015a). The militia’s contribution to the country’s 
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ocean defence and maritime rights protection activities has been recently growing in national 
strategy. The 2013 Defence White Paper stressed that they were to ‘serve as an assistant and a backup 
force of the PLA’ in performing three main missions: defending China from external threats; and to 
assist security forces to ensure social stability and in responding to disaster relief (Erickson and 
Kennedy, 2017, 2-3). Whilst the actual number of militia boats in service remains unknown, scholars 
have revealed that already in 1978 this force included some 140,000 crafts with some 750,000 members 
(Erickson and Kennedy, 2016, 2). The PAFMM is subject to a ‘dual-responsibility system’ which 
makes it a separate component of the Chinese military that can be mobilised to work and operate 
within the military’s command structure (Erickson and Kennedy 2017, 3-5). They usually perform 
civilian tasks – notably fishing; they receive nonetheless regular training; they are provided with 
advanced communication and other specific equipment. This has included in the past weapons like 
mines and PRGs to engage with foreign ships (Tisdall 2016; Erickson and Kennedy, 2015b; Erickson 
and Kennedy, 2015c). 
 
Reportedly, the CCG and the PAFMM have come to play frontline roles in China’s conduct of 
operations to assert its maritime rights (Morris 2017, 77-83; Martinson 2016, 193-200; Martinson 2017, 
2-4; Erickson and Kennedy, 2016, 4-8). What makes these actions coercive in nature is that fact that 
these assertions of presence take place in contested spaces. Thus, constabulary coercive activities have 
had two main aims, showing presence and control of uninhabited offshore islands or, like in the case 
of the Senkaku Islands, disputing other parties’ claims and control. Tactically, the most articulated 
expression of the latter type of operations have included the CCG ‘routinized’ incursions inside the 
territorial waters around the Japanese- controlled Senkaku Islands – ongoing since October 2013. 
 
Similar, albeit less frequent, operations have occurred in the airspace too, with a Y-12 fixed-wing 
aircraft belonging to the State Oceanic Administration entering inside the islands airspace in 
December 2012 and, in May 2017, by a small drone.5 Initial CCG patrols inside the islands’ territorial 
waters during the 2012-13 period have produced numerous close encounters and stand-offs with the 
Japan Coast Guard (JCG). More recently, in August 2016, this category of coercive actions was 
extended to include the deployment of the CCG to enforce Chinese ‘rights’ to exploit fisheries. At that 
time, the CCG escorted 200-300 fishing boats operating in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku 
islands deploying up to 15 assets in the area.6  
 
The maritime militia, on the other hand, has been regularly employed to conduct both types of 
activities. The notion of ‘national defence mobilisation for low-intensity maritime rights protection’ 
 
5 Authors’s interview with senior official, Strategic Intelligence Division, Japan Ministry of Defence, 
Tokyo, 02 June 2017. 
6 Ibid.. 
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underwrites the militias’ mobilisation system. In constabulary actives, militias have contributed to 
escort assets owned by Chinese corporations for the conduct of scientific exploration and resource 
exploitation in contested areas, as well as to ensure regular and continuous presence. In regards to the 
former, in 2013, the Sanya Fugang Fisheries Co. Ltd., one of the leading militia organisations in the 
Hainan Province provided escorts to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) survey 
vessels near Triton Island. In May 2014, the then PLA’s Guangzhou Military Region Command 
supervised PAFMM unites from Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan, as they escorted CNOOC HYSY-
981 drilling platform to operate in an area in dispute between China and Vietnam (Martinson 2016, 
200-201). In relation to presence operations, data analysis of Automated Identification System (AIS) 
pertaining to vessels operated by the Sansha Maritime Militia established systematic patters of 
deployment to the Chinese controlled Spratly Islands – including Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and 
Subi Reef – as well as at the Scarborough Shoal.7 
 
In the realm of military coercion, some of the militia’s core functions have revolved around providing 
support to the PLA, from transportation services, to search and rescue, resupply, reconnaissance and 
surveillance, and even in combat. Indeed, its expanded use in constabulary operations has not 
diminished its contribution in military coercion. In terms of ISR, the Hai’an militia regiment in 
Jiangsu Province was documented gathering information during a US naval exercise in 2014, and 
today fields some 119 vessels all equipped with advanced radar and Beidou satellite navigation 
system. Militia units regularly conduct harassment and sabotage operations against foreign naval 
vessels, as in the cases of USNS Bowditch (2002), USNS Impeccable (2009), or as in the 2014 case of 
obstruction of supplies to the Filipino detachment on an outpost at the Second Thomas Shoal 
(Erickson and Kennedy 2015c). Undersea warfare support operations are also part of the militias 
portfolio, with a reported case in 2015 of senior Chinese naval commander from the PLAN East Sea 
Fleet visiting the Beilun District of Ningbo City to supervise the reorganisation of a ‘reserve survey 
vessel squadron’ – a likely addition to the East Sea Fleet in times of urgency.8 
 
 
A Strategy for Maritime Control: Linking Plausible Legality and Tactical Asymmetry 
Why does make Chinese military and constabulary coercion part of a hybrid strategy? The answer to 
this question rests on how Chinese authorities have managed to mobilise plausible political and legal 
rhetoric to downplay a broader strategic intent to exert military control over the ESCS. Since at least 
2011, Chinese authorities have in fact defined the country’s maritime empowerment terms that 
suggest the functional subordination of constabulary coercion to military activities. At that time, 
 
7 Kennedy, Conor M. (2017) ‘Maritime Militia Operations and Trends – Gray Zone Tactics’, paper 
presented at the conference China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, China Maritime Studies Institute, 
Naval War College, RI, 2-3 May, 110-117. 
8 Ibid., 114. 
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former President Hu Jintao was among the first leaders to clearly link the growing significance of 
naval power to national security, pointing out that the navy had to speed up ‘its transformation and 
modernisation in a sturdy way, and make extended preparations for warfare in order to make greater 
contributions to safeguard national security’ (BBC News 2011). A year later, during the 18th Party 
Congress, he further formalised this view that military power had to be ‘commensurate with China’s 
international standing’ to ‘carry out their historic mission in the new stage in the new century’ (Hu 
2012). 
 
Hu’s successor, President Xi Jinping, made sure to follow up on this quest and indeed he has been 
central to all major policy decisions in the ESCS since his come to power (Kyodo, 02 December 2017). 
Under his guidance, the quest for maritime power has been given political support and adequate 
funding (Martinson 2016b). In the defence white paper published in 2014, naval missions were set to 
expand, encompassing sea-lanes defence and overseas interests’ security, in addition to protect 
sovereignty, because ‘the seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable 
development of China’ (CMoD 2014). Accordingly, the first point of order for future force 
development focused on the navy (CMoD 2014). This prioritisation was consistent with an influential 
assessment published a year earlier which expected threats to national security ‘(…) mainly from the 
sea’. Indeed, ‘the focal point of military struggle is mainly in the sea’ (Academy of Military Science 
2013, 209). In official defence policy circles, the sea was taking centre stage; within it, the ESCS were 
China’s first lines of defence and power projection basins – with this idea encompassing also the 
ability of Chinese maritime capabilities to ensure the exploitation of resources as well as. Indeed, in 
Chinese official policy documents, capabilities for ‘open seas protection’ were needed in addition to 
those for ‘offshore defence’ (CMoD 2015; Campbell 2015). 
 
Support for naval modernisation and expansion was not a phenomenon without precedents; over the 
decades, as Chinese maritime interests had expanded, so had the boundaries of ‘ocean defence’ and 
the requirements to meet them (Fravel and Liebman 2011). Nonetheless, as one new study has shown, 
by 2017, plans for capabilities build-up were continuing unabated (Dutton and Martinson 2017); 
crucially, the military dimension of becoming a maritime power was openly intertwined with the 
country’s leadership ultimate objectives of political affirmation. During a visit to the navy’s 
headquarters in March, President Xi reportedly linked the navy to the nation’s goal ‘of great 
rejuvenation’ (Xinhua 2017). In a vision of neo-Mahanian flavour, he regarded a ‘strong and modern 
force’, with the confidence and capabilities ‘to defeat all invading enemies and safeguard China’s 
national sovereignty, security, and development interests’ was more important than at any other time 




In some respects, it is not surprising that the second largest world economy regarded strong maritime 
capabilities as a national priority. Indeed, international prestige, the security of nationals overseas 
and economic assets, and some aspects of territorial defence have put naval power in the driving seat 
of defence policy (Cole 2011; McDevitt 2016, 7-21). By the same token, it should come as no surprise 
that this need for stronger maritime power has extended to the development of constabulary 
capabilities too. Since the passage of the 1992 law on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone’, the 
expression ‘maritime rights and interests’ had slowly gained prominence in Chinese debates, a fact 
further reinforced by the ratification of UNCLOS in 1996. By 2012, the intention to put pressure on the 
Japanese government in regards to China’s territorial claims over the Senkaku islands led Chinese 
authorities to step up the empowerment of its constabulary forces (Pugliese and Insisa 2017, 63-67). 
By 2013, senior officials at the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) had reiterated its significance as a 
precondition to become a maritime power (Kardon 2015, 7). As a concept, ‘maritime rights and 
interests’ comprised the economic development, the legal management, and the effective political and 
strategic control of the areas of the oceans claimed by China (McDevitt 2016, 4). These claims, in turn, 
were based upon a combination of frameworks, encompassing unclear ‘historical rights’, UNCLOS, as 
well as customary rules about ocean conduct. In March 2013, the decision to implement the 
reorganisation and enhancement of the CCG under SOA’s responsibility was another non-negligible 
opportunity to further the protection of maritime rights and interests. 
 
The need to secure the country’s maritime rights and interest has this emerged as a factor reinforcing 
and expanding China’s broader maritime agenda. Access and control to Chinese maritime rights and 
interests were one basic condition to become a maritime power and to complete ‘national 
rejuvenation’. The issue is that this goal stood at odds with the competing territorial claims and the 
contested maritime boundaries of the ESCS. In the South China Sea, Chinese claims amounted to the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands, as well as to an area more than 80% of the resource-rich basin by means 
of the so-called ‘9-dashed line’. Statements from senior Chinese officials would point to a view to 
regard the space within this dotted line as ‘Chinese jurisdiction’, if not territory (Rose and 
Brunnstrom, 2015; Zhou 2016; Wei 2016). The legality of this dotted line, however, has not only been 
criticised within academic circles, but it has also been dismissed by the ruling of tribunal in the South 
China Sea arbitration case (Malik 2013; Hayton 2014, Chapters 1-4; Jacobs, 2014, 2-9; PCA 2016, 117, 
473). In the East China Sea too, Chinese sovereignty claims over the Senkaku islands and concerning 
the boundary delimitation dispute with Japan speak to a legal cherry-picking to maximise claims over 
a potentially resource-rich space that draws upon controversial evidence (Patalano 2014, 37-42; 
Jacobs, 2014, 10-21; Drifte 2013, 12-19). 
 
Existing analysis of Chinese maritime interactions in the ESCS would further corroborate the view 
that Beijing’s authorities maintain a particularly instrumental – some authors suggested ‘distorted’ – 
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use of the law of the sea that draws upon less developed or clearly-defined areas to advance 
justification for claims and actions (Kraska and Wilson 2009, Odom 2011; Cohen 2016). In the words 
of former President Jiang Zemin, ‘(w)e must be adept at using international law as “a weapon” to 
defend the interests of our state and maintain national pride’ (Odom 2011, 223). 
 
It is within this understanding of China as a rising maritime power that the country’s hybrid strategy 
has been taking shape. In particular, Chinese authorities have sought to mobilise political and legal 
rhetoric to support the country’s coercive action in two ways. First, the official rhetoric has sought to 
downplay the nature of Chinese capabilities – crucial to deter other actors and to compel them to 
acquiesce to Chinese positions. Second, it has endeavoured to present Chinese actions as a measured 
response to a situation created by others. This rhetoric has been essential to allow military and 
constabulary coercion to advance Chinese goals and maritime claims by means of the so-called 
‘salami slicing’ (Haddick 2012). Concurrently, Beijing’s rhetoric of lawful actions and measured 
responses has sought to cast counter actions under an escalatory light, de facto forcing other actors to 
either risk further escalation or, to favour acquiescence and acceptance of the new situation. These 
tactical objectives would be consistent with those presented in Chinese military manuals focusing on 
the role of public information operations to control the narrative to advance China’s interests, and to 
undermine the opponent’s ability through attempts to create international sympathy and support, 
whilst demoralising the opponent (Kania 2016, 10-12). 
 
Such an instrumental attempt to create an image of responsible actor facing unfair treatment has been 
mobilised both in the military and constabulary dimensions. As far as military coercion is concerned, 
the most glaring example of this are the above mentioned military outposts in the South China Sea. 
Their radar, air, and naval capabilities can sustain regular patrol, ISR, and conventional and strategic 
deterrence tasks in the basin – with significant consequences on the strategic balance of the basin in 
itself. Yet, their military potential remains downplayed as legitimate and lawful developments of 
national territory. On Woody Island, the emphasis is on the civilian component of local structures 
including restaurants, ATM machines, and tea shops (Chiu 2016). As of March 2017, cruise ships and 
commercial flights operated to Woody Island, whilst test flights by commercial aircraft had been 
conducted at Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief reefs in the Spratly Islands (Wong 2017).9 In July, the 
first cinema with cutting-edge ‘4K digital projectors as well as a 3D perforated screen’ opened on 
Woody Island, to allow ‘residents and soldiers’ to ‘enjoy films simultaneously with moviegoers across 
the country’ (People’s Daily, 23 July2017). Chinese civilian projects on the reef have been used to 
allow for a story that replaces the controversy of power projection with a story of legitimate economic 
development. 
 
9 Authors’s interview with senior official, Strategic Intelligence Division, Japan Ministry of Defence, 
Tokyo, 17 March 2017. 
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This effort is further compounded by attempts to present military deployment of capabilities as 
‘measured’, ‘incremental’, and ‘reactive’ in nature. In 2016, Just a few months after President Xi’s 
pledge of non-militarisation of the outposts, Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted that the defence 
facilities on the Spratly Islands were ‘in accordance with international law, which endows any 
sovereign state with the rights of self-protection and self-defense’ (People’s Daily, 17 February 2016). 
His hope was that the media could ‘pay more attention to the civilian facilities China has built and is 
going to build on relevant islands and reefs, which are the public goods provided for the international 
community’ (People’s Daily, 17 February 2016). Chinese defence officials, on the other hand, were of 
the opinion that extra regional actors such as the United States and Japan were ‘militarising’ the 
ESCS. In March 2016, after new images of the islands reclamation process were released, Chinese 
officials took advantage of a US carrier sailing into the South China Sea to make this point. They 
stressed how ‘China has always committed itself to maintaining regional peace and stability, and is 
highly concerned about the related countries’ activities of militarizing the South China Sea’ (China 
Military Online, 07 March 2016). The Ministry of Defence spokesperson added to this perception by 
stressing also how the Japanese activation of a radar station on Yonaguni island in the East China Sea 
represented a similarly provocative act. From his perspective,  
 
‘if China’s deployment of necessary defense facilities on its islands and reefs is blamed for “undermining freedom 
of navigation”, what should Japan’s action be called when it strengthened military deployment around the narrow 
Yonaguni-Iriomote Channel, which is an international water channel connecting the East China Sea and the West 
Pacific?’ (CMoD. 31 March 2016). 
 
On a similar note, Chinese officials have spared no effort to portray comments and actions 
challenging Chinese military coercion as symptomatic of double standards, of aggressive behaviours 
against China, or indeed of ‘hegemonism in disguise’. One main source of contention in this regards 
draws upon a difference in view concerning Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) access for foreign 
military vessels and aircraft. For example, Chinese authorities have been systematically seeking to 
present activities such as the US Navy Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) under an 
escalatory light in a way that was inconsistent with their intended nature and history (Stander 2017). 
In 2015, a Chinese media commentary on US FONOPs blasted ‘Washington’s promotion of maritime 
militarization and threats of other countries’ sovereignty and national security in disguise of 
navigation freedom’ as ‘against international law’ (Xinhua 19 November 2015). In 2016, shortly after 
the release of the annual freedom of navigation report, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson 
Hua Chunying commented that these activities showed the American attempt ‘(…) to dominate 
maritime order and reflect its logic of hegemony and exceptionalism in its treatment of international 




In the realm of constabulary activities, the idea of a ‘lawful pursuit’ of territorial claims served to 
mask a similar capability asymmetry that favours China vis-à-vis other claimants. Lyle Morris and 
Ryan Martinson have convincingly proved how, compared to other regional coast guards in the 
ESCS, the CCG has today no equal in aggregated tonnage. Specifically, their research shows a 
significant increase in ocean-going cutters above 500tons, especially between 2,000 and 3,000 tons. 
Yet, the CCG vessels are not merely getting larger and, as a result, more enduring. They’re gaining 
greater firepower. Large vessels procured before the merger were already equipped with advanced 
equipment such as water cannons and deafening sirens. Evidence shows that Chinese water cannons 
are already capable of projecting jets of seawater to some 100m and to disable communication 
equipment of other vessels (Martinson 2016). 
 
Significantly, post-merger ocean going capabilities feature also deck armament. The new super 
cutters are built with a 76mm main gun (Martinson, 03 July 2015). Decommissioned PLAN frigates 
joining the CCG have retained two 37mm turrets (Gady 2015); new designs for the leading Zhaoduan 
and Zhaojun classes are being also fitted with 76mm main guns. Within the constabulary realm, it is 
worth noting that he militia forces too are an asymmetric force, provided equipment for advanced 
communication and, in some cases, mine and interdiction and harassment operations (Tisdall, 2016; 
Erickson and Kennedy, 2015b; Erickson and Kennedy, 2015c). 
 
In the constabulary context, the Chinese use of the image of the measured and lawful actor reacting to 
the circumstances is best explained by the on-going standoff within the territorial waters of the 
Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands. In September 2012, in the aftermath of the Japanese 
government’s announcement to purchase three of the islands, Chinese authorities felt they were 
‘completely justified’ to ‘take necessary measures to safeguard national territorial sovereignty and 
uphold historical facts and justice’ (CMFA, 13 September 2012). As the Assistant Foreign Minister 
further articulated shortly thereafter, the necessary measures included the establishment of base 
points and baselines of the territorial sea around the islands in line with 1992 law to allow for a 
clearer legal basis to ‘safeguard China’s sovereignty’ (CMFA, 14 September 2012). 
 
This was coupled by the deployment of surveillance vessels in the territorial waters, the 
announcement of routine surveillance and survey, and the broadcasting of meteorological forecasts of 
the islands on national television (CMFA, 14 September 2012). What Japan had done constituted a ‘a 
gross violation of China’s territorial sovereignty’, one that spoke volumes of Tokyo’s political shift 
towards ‘ultra-rightism’ and that as such, represented a problem for the international community 
(CMFA, 13 September 2012). As Pugliese and Insisa have pointed out, the Chinese response was part 
of a broader and complex campaign – which involved Chinese officialdom and elements of academia 
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– to present a cohesive voice to influence foreign ‘opinion leaders’ about the ‘rightfulness’ of the 
Chinese views and actions (Pugliese and Insisa 2017, 104-107). 
 
Since China’s initial reactions in 2012 and until the second half of 2017, neither the conduct of ‘patrols’ 
around the islands, nor the nature of the rhetoric over the Chinese need to pressure Japan changed 
significantly. In September 2014, the Chinese MFA spokesperson reiterated Chinese stance on the 
matter, noticing that it was up to Japan to take steps to improve bilateral relations, and that 
government assets now patrolled the islands ‘on a regular basis’ (CMoD, 11 September 2014). Until 
the end of 2015, increased Chinese patrols had in fact settled on a ‘routine’ of three incursions per 
month, with the exception of July 2014 and 2015 – when there were only two incursions.10 This, in 
turn, opened up opportunities for further coercive actions to adapt to new circumstances depending 
on the evolution of the bilateral relations.  
 
In December 2015, at the end of a year that had seen little progress on the bilateral maritime disputes 
and witnessed the emergence of Japan as a more critical voice of Chinese actions in the South China 
Sea, CCG deployments started to feature armed vessels (AFP 2015). Early in 2016, the Japanese 
response to what was confirmed by then as be the deployment of an armed vessel was to highlight 
the prospect of the re-activation of a law authorising the navy to intervene in support of the JCG in 
case of armed vessels entering Japanese territorial waters – a law first established during North 
Korean naval incursions in the early 2000s (Reuters, 12 January 2016). The Chinese official reactions 
were immediate. Within the day, officials downplayed the question of the armed vessels, pointing out 
that ‘China’s navigation and patrol activities in the relevant waters near the Diaoyu Islands are 
completely legitimate’, calling the Japanese not ‘(…) to confuse the right and wrong on the issue of 
the Diaoyu Islands (…)’ (CMoD, 15 January 2016; Reuters 13, Januray 2016). From their perspective, 
their actions were lawful, legitimate and necessary to counter Japan’s continued attempts to violate 
Chinese sovereignty.  
 
 
Conclusions: Chinese coercion in the ESCS as a Hybrid Strategy 
As one commentator recently noted, sovereignty ‘(…) is a nebulous concept – signifying a concern 
with power, but identifying no safeguards to prevent its abuse’ (Sadakat 2017). This would seem to be 
true in the case of Chinese coercion in the ESCS. In China, national authorities regard maritime 
capabilities as a central tool of statecraft heralding the country’s ascendancy to the world stage. The 
pursuit of capabilities needed to acquire the control of the contested spaces claimed in the ESCS 
reinforces the quest for those required to protect wider interests outside their confines. In a context 
 
10 Authors’s interview with senior official, Strategic Intelligence Division, Japan Ministry of Defence, 
Tokyo, 17 March 2017. 
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where competing claims demands to defend every ‘inch’ of China’s land and every ‘drop of its 
water’, Chinese authorities regard the sea as a place of ‘struggle’ where maritime claims are 
prerequisite for, and subject to, power projection, and where might makes right. 
 
This is why China’s strategy of coercion in the ESCS is a hybrid strategy. It mobilises military, 
paramilitary, and constabulary means to achieve clear geostrategic objectives in which legal gains 
over the status of island features and portions of the ESCS serve the projection of power and influence 
within and beyond these basins. It is a hybrid strategy because coercion encompasses passive and 
active measures. It is a hybrid strategy because it seeks to downplay the nature of coercion by 
presenting actions as lawful, measured, and reactive. It is a hybrid strategy because it seeks to 
coordinate and synchronise tactical activities and political and legal rhetoric to prevent or limit 
responses. It is a hybrid strategy because there is no indication that such a strategy rules out higher 
degrees of the use of force. The Chinese literature points to a statement of a preferred aim (i.e. 
winning without fighting), not to a statement of commitment. 
 
This leads to four broader conclusions. First, military and constabulary coercion may overlap to an 
extent, but they are different in ambitions and objectives. This distinction is significant both 
intellectually and practically. Intellectually, Chinese constabulary coercion weakens the principles of 
peaceful disputes resolutions of maritime disputes enshrined in established legal frameworks such as 
UNCLOS. It also undermines the spirit of regional agreements like the 2002 Declaration of Conduct 
(DoC) signed by China and ASEAN, which similarly reaffirms the use of peaceful means to approach 
maritime disputes. Practically, this distinction is relevant because countering military coercion 
requires a discussion on the strategic value of the ESCS beyond specific claims, to better evaluate the 
costs and benefits of meeting the challenge.  
 
The second conclusion unfolds directly from the first. This distinction matters in that it requires 
analysts, scholars and policymakers alike to articulate interests and responses in light of both. 
Military coercion requires non-claimant states to prioritise the assessment of their ability to coexist 
and interact with Beijing against eventual treaty obligations, as in the case of the United States vis-à-
vis Japan in the East China Sea. Claimant states however may wish to focus on deterring and 
countering constabulary coercion. Against this background, non-claimant state actors like the United 
States, Australia, India, France, the United Kingdom, or Japan (in the South China Sea) but with 
strategic interests in regional stability may opt to focus on indirect support – in the form of capacity 




The third consideration concerns the role of political and legal rhetoric in the pursuit of military and 
constabulary objectives. In a hybrid context, their purpose is to downplay constabulary and military 
initiatives, to present them under a positive light, and to enhance the effectiveness of coercion. 
Political and legal rhetoric are, therefore, inherent tools of the coercive machinery and as such, they 
need to be addressed for counteractions to be effective. Inconsistent or misleading accounts should be 
challenged to reduce their ability to cast responses under escalatory light. One recent example is 
offered by the work of the team at the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). Shortly after the 
50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila, the AMTI team published analysis of recent 
imagery that directly challenged Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s assertion that China was no 
longer carrying out land reclamation in the South China Sea. 
 
Lastly, unlike the grey zone concept, the notion of a hybrid strategy conveys a much needed sense of 
connectivity of the space between peace and war. In particular, since constabulary coercion is 
subordinated to the broader objectives of military coercion the hybrid vocabulary better captures the 
objective risk that war may actually happen if prolonged and systematic acts of coercion are not fully 
addressed. The link between constabulary and military coercion suggests that individual actions have 
also cumulative effects. Passive military coercion such as the enhancement of military outposts in the 
South China Sea as much as active measures like the development of weaponised maritime law-
enforcement and militia forces have immediate effects but also longer term impact. 
 
In terms of military coercion, as Chinese authorities have often stressed, the current state of the 
enhanced islands in the South China Sea presents only a limited immediate military threat. But the 
design and military potential of their capabilities speaks of much more substantial long-term impact. 
The cumulative effect created by a sustained enhancement may very well contribute to create a more 
dangerous operational context especially given the functional connection between maritime claims 
and strategic objectives in the ESCS. The steady enhancement of military and law-enforcement 
capabilities deployed in the East China Sea in the context of the Sino-Japanese territorial disputes, for 
example, raises this very question. How long will it take before the deployment of enhanced Chinese 
capabilities for constabulary coercion create a context that undermines both Japanese control of the 
Senkaku islands and the basin’s operational balance? How will this cumulative effect inform the 
action of Japan as both a claimant state and a power with an interest in the status quo of the strategic 
balance? How should the potential long-term strategic effect of constabulary coercion inform the 
action of non-claimant parties like the United States, with similar interests in the strategic status quo? 
The answers to these questions are far from self-evident. Yet, the use of a hybrid strategy framework 
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